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1. Introduction 
Italy is characterised by marked regional heterogeneity. As is well known, the Southern 
regionsi of Italy (Mezzogiorno for short) have consistently lagged behind the rest of the 
country in terms of per capita income and economic performance (Allen and Stevenson, 
1974; Putnam, 1993; Paci and Saba, 1998). What are the factors which can explain the poor 
performance of these regions? A consensus has emerged among economists that a crucial 
characteristic of the Mezzogiorno economy is its sluggish supply side and ultimately its 
incapability to reach levels of total factor productivity (TFP henceforth) close to those of 
the Northern regions (for surveys of the relevant literature see Faini et al., 1993; Aiello and 
Scoppa, 2000; D’Acunto et al., 2004). For instance TFP in Italian industry grew on average 
at a rate of about 1.5 % per annum from 1970 to 1998, but its level remained consistently 
lower in the Southern regions. The percentage gap between industrial TFP in the 
Mezzogiorno and in the rest of Italy was 23% in 1970, 22% in 1984 and 25% in 1998, 
showing no sign of a catching-up process. In recent years, considerable scientific interest 
has arisen about the role that public capital can play in raising TFP. Several authors (Picci, 
1999; Acconcia and Del Monte, 2000; Aiello and Scoppa, 2000; Bonaglia et al., 2000) have 
pointed out that public capital has a positive and significant impact on TFP in the Southern 
regions. These findings have obvious implications for the lively political debate about the 
role that public investment programmes can have in enhancing TFP in the private sector 
and in promoting the development of weaker areas.ii
From a methodological standpoint, this evidence is very much rooted in the seminal 
contribution of Aschauer (1989), who measured the impact of infrastructure on private 
output in the US by estimating an aggregate production function augmented by the stock of 
public capital. Various methodological objections have been raised about the validity of this 
estimation framework. First, in this approach, public capital is obviously assumed to be 
exogenous. However, feedback effects running from output and TFP to public capital may 
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invalidate this assumption (Eisner, 1991; Tatom, 1991), which has seldom been tested in 
empirical work. Second, virtually all the empirical studies share the hypothesis of a Cobb-
Douglas functional form for the production function. Imposing such a restrictive functional 
form may create biases in the parameter estimates. Third, attention has been drawn to the 
potential non-stationary nature of the data and the possible long-run relationships existing 
among the variables (Tatom, 1991; Munnell, 1992). The estimation procedure must take 
these features in due account. Fourth, it has been maintained that the significance of the 
infrastructure-productivity nexus can arise from unobserved heterogeneity among units in 
the regression. Indeed, it was observed that, once unobserved regional effects were allowed 
within US state panels, the elasticity of output to public capital was often no longer 
significant.  
In this paper we provide some new estimates for the empirical relationship between 
public capital and industrial TFP across the 20 Italian administrative regions, analysing a 
longer time period (1970-98) and adopting a finer regional disaggregation than those 
considered in previous studies. Our ultimate goal is to assess the robustness of the evidence 
on the productivity of public capital (especially in the Mezzogiorno) from various 
standpoints. Therefore we test for the existence of a long-run relationship between total 
factor productivity and public capital (through panel techniques fully allowing for 
parameter heterogeneity across regions), and assess the weak exogeneity hypothesis for 
public capital adopting the procedure suggested in Urbain (1992). We provide non-
parametric estimates of the infrastructure-productivity nexus, independent of any 
assumption on functional form. Also, we control for the role of human capital on growth, in 
view of the large regional differences in size and evolution of educational attainment. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of the 
empirical literature on the relationship between public capital and TFP. Section 3 describes 
the empirical procedures and the data, while the results are shown and commented in 
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Section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Infrastructures and TFP: A Survey of the Existing Empirical Literature 
A number of empirical studies have attempted to quantify the relationship between 
public capital accumulation and productivity through the estimation of a production 
function augmented by the stock of public capital. The canonical examples of this approach 
are Aschauer (1989) and Munnell (1990). They estimate a Cobb-Douglas production 
function using national time series data for the US and other OECD countries covering the 
period from after Second World War to end of the 1980s. Both authors find large 
elasticities of output to public capital. These initial studies have been followed by a raft of 
papers,iii mostly carried out on US data, both at national and regional (state) level. 
Regional studies allow relaxation of the assumptions of uniform marginal factor 
productivity and technical progress within national boundaries. They are characterised more 
often than not by insignificant elasticities, while national level studies usually come up with 
significant public capital – growth relationships. For instance Evans and Karras (1994) and 
Holtz-Eakin (1994) find that the elasticity of output to public capital is not significant once 
unobserved regional effects are allowed within US state panels. 
Two other early methodological issues pertain to the assumption of exogeneity for 
public capital and to the use of a restrictive functional form for the production function. In 
the first case, it has been argued that the established positive correlation between TFP and 
public capital could imply that TFP has a significant impact on public capital and not the 
other way round. Public capital would then behave as a normal good, whose demand 
increases when TFP and disposable income increase (Eisner, 1991; Tatom, 1991). The 
second issue relates to the frequent use of the Cobb-Douglas functional form, almost 
invariably with constant returns to scale, for the production function. It has been suggested 
that this restrictive set-up may be a source of upward bias in the estimating the output 
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elasticity to infrastructure (Gramlich, 1994).  
Another important methodological issue concerns the non-stationary nature of the data. 
Tatom (1991) first points out that, if public capital and the other variables are non-
stationary, spurious statistical significance of the regression is likely to ensue. A first 
response to this problem was to first-difference the series (Evans and Karras, 1994; Garcia 
et al., 1996). However, estimation in first-differences removes all trend components, 
putting heavy weight on high-frequency disturbances: in a static specification, this is 
equivalent to assume that the impact on productivity of an increase in public capital in one 
year is fully realised during the same year (see Munnell, 1992). By contrast, economic 
theory suggests that TFP is affected by public capital at much lower frequencies. Indeed it 
is even suggested that the stock of public capital may have a permanent impact on 
productivity. More in detail, the following two channels are usually considered in the 
growth literature. First, public capital can raise the productivity of private capital so that the 
whole economy becomes more productive (Fisher and Turnovsky, 1998; Glomm and 
Ravikumar, 1998). This means that there is a stock of technical progress waiting “on the 
shelf” that can be incorporated in the production when new public investments take place 
(Canning et al., 1994). Second, investments in public capital may favour specialisation in 
sectors (or technologies) with higher productivity. For instance, transport infrastructures, by 
improving communications and by increasing the size of the market, allow firms to have 
access to high-volume and high-tech production techniques and therefore have a positive 
and permanent impact on aggregate productivity (Chatterjee et al., 2003). 
Therefore, in recent years, there has been considerable search for steady-state 
relationships between public capital and TFP. The evidence is quite mixed. Some studies 
report evidence in favour of the existence of such a relationship (Lau and Sin, 1997; Batina, 
1998; Albala-Bertrand and Mamatzakis, 2001; Everaert and Heylen, 2001), while others do 
not find it (Pereira and Flores de Frutos, 1999; Pereira, 2000; Sturm et al., 1995; Sturm and 
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De Haan, 1995). This lack of conclusive evidence is not surprising, given the well-known 
lack of power of unit root and cointegration tests in small samples. A possible solution to 
the problem of small sample size is to use some recently developed testing procedures 
which use both the time-series and the cross-section information content of the data (Im et 
al., 2003; Pedroni, 1997, 1999). 
There is an additional point to be made on the steady-state relationship between public 
capital and TFP. Its existence may mean that it is public capital to be driven by TFP 
according to the arguments made in Eisner (1991) and Tatom (1991). The stock of public 
capital has a permanent impact on productivity if there is a steady-state relationship and 
public capital is a long-run forcing variable, in the parlance of Granger and Lin (1995). In 
this case there are significant long-run effects from public capital to TFP, but not the other 
way round. As will be shown in Section 3, in a VECM set-up it is easy to ascertain whether 
public capital is long-run forcing. Interestingly, the same procedure was suggested in 
Urbain (1992) as a weak exogeneity test more powerful than the customary Hausman test.  
Some of the above evoked issues have also been treated within the Italian literature on 
the relationship between public capital accumulation and productivity. Two studies of 
particular methodological interest are Picci (1999) and Bonaglia et al. (2000). Picci (1999) 
adopts panel data techniques in order to overcome the misgivings aired in Evans and 
Karras (1994) and in Holtz-Eakin (1994) about the neglect of cross-section heterogeneity 
(in this case among Italian regions). Cobb-Douglas production functions relating regional 
GDP to labour, private capital and public capital are estimated for the 20 Italian regions 
using pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models over the period 1970-1995. 
Further evidence is provided with respect to two sub-periods (1970-1982 and 1983-1995) 
and four macro-regions (North-West, North-East, Centre and South). Unlike in most of the 
US literature, output elasticity to public capital is found positive and significant (0.36) for 
the whole country also allowing for unobserved regional (and time) effects. Estimated 
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elasticities are generally higher for the second sub-period, for the Southern regions, and in 
correspondence of the “core” component of public capital (see below for the definition of 
this component.). Interestingly, Picci (1999) also provides some tests of the Cobb-Douglas 
assumption. A 2nd-order translog functional form does not yield a significantly better fit for 
the production function. However, public capital is markedly less significant in the translog 
set-up, suggesting that further testing of the sensitivity of results to the functional form 
assumption may be appropriate. 
Bonaglia et al. (2000) evaluate the impact of public capital on regional industrial output 
through three different methodologies: an index-based growth accounting approach, a 
production function approach (similar to the one adopted in Picci, 1999) and a cost 
function approach.iv Again, evidence is provided for all regions and years (1970-1994), and 
for different sub-periods and (four) macro-regions. The main findings leave some doubts 
on the robustness of the infrastructure-productivity nexus in industry: public capital seems 
to contribute positively to growth for all regions and periods only within the index-based 
growth accounting approach (the elasticity of TFP growth to public capital growth being 
estimated at 0.47). On the other hand, no pervasive significant role is found for public 
capital as an input in the production function and as a shift term in the cost function. When 
dealing with regionally disaggregated evidence, the results indicate that at least the 
Mezzogiorno (and the Centre) regions benefit from public capital provision as an input in 
the production function and as a shift term in the cost function. Bonaglia et al. (2000) also 
consider the possibility that their estimates may be affected by the endogeneity of public 
capital. They report results from Hausman tests and instrumental variable estimates 
according to which endogeneity of public capital is not a problem. However, Urbain 
(1992) convincingly argues that there may be serious power problems for the Hausman test 
in a time series set-up, and provides an alternative test. Hence the interest of adopting the 
latter procedure in testing the (weak) exogeneity assumption for public capital. 
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These methodological considerations set an agenda for further empirical analysis on the 
relationships between public capital and TFP across the Italian regions, which will be 
spelled out in the next section. 
 
3. The Empirical Analysis: Methodology and Data  
Our empirical analysis is articulated into two stages. First, we test for the existence of a 
long-run relationship between public capital and TFP, fully allowing for regional parameter 
heterogenity (Im et al., 2001; Pedroni, 1997, 1999). We also assess whether public capital 
is long-run forcing (Granger and Lin, 1995), which corresponds to the weak exogeneity test 
proposed by Urbain (1992). In the second stage, we test the significance of public capital 
within a non-parametric set-up based on the Free Disposal Hull (FDH: see Deprins et al., 
1984; Tulkens, 1993; Kerstens and Vanden Eeckaut, 1999). By carrying out a non-
parametric analysis of the relationship between output and public capital, we gauge the 
robustness of the results from the econometric estimates in relationship to the assumptions 
about functional form and returns to scale in the production function. 
In our empirical analysis we analyse a longer time period (1970-98) than those 
considered in previous studies. We concentrate on the industrial sector (mining and 
manufacturing; electricity, gas and water; construction). This choice is justified both by the 
strategic importance of this sector as an engine of regional growth in Italy and Europe (Paci 
et al., 2003) and by the doubts that the findings of Bonaglia et al. (2000) leave on the 
robustness of the public capital-TFP nexus in industry. The data on regional value added, 
labour units, and labour incomev have been taken from ISTAT Regional Accounting. The 
data for the stock of private capital provided by Raffaele Paci and Nicola Pusceddu from 
CRENOS, University of Cagliari, for the 1970-1994 period, were extended until 1998 
following the same procedure adopted in Paci and Pusceddu (2000) for the previous period. 
The data on the stock of public capital have been provided by Lucio Picci from University 
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of Bologna, and are obtained applying a perpetual inventory procedure on investment in 
public infrastructures.vi Following a common procedure in this literature, these series are 
originally disaggregated in various categories (telecommunications, road and airports, 
harbours, railroads, educational and public buildings, water and electricity, hospitals, 
others), allowing us to construct two stocks for core and non-core infrastructures, as well as 
of a total stock. Core infrastructures include road and airports, harbours, railroads, water 
and electricity, telecommunications, while non-core infrastructures include educational and 
other public buildings, hospitals, other infrastructures.  
A further novelty of our empirical analysis is that we correct the labour input for the 
regional stock of human capital. The crucial relevance of human capital for growth has 
been highlighted in a host of contributions stemming from Lucas (1988) and Mankiw et al. 
(1992). Neglecting this variable is a potentially serious source of misspecification, 
especially if one considers the large differences in size and evolution of human capital 
endowments across Italian regions.vii Following what is by now common practice in growth 
accounting, we adopted the technique suggested in Hall and Jones (1999) in order to 
augment labour for human capital. Let Lit stand for the number of employees (in a given 
industry) in region i at time t, Fit and Mit for the average number of years of education of, 
respectively, female and male employees (in a given industry) in region i at time t. The 
latter are taken from Destefanis et al. (2004), where details are provided about the 
procedure utilised to obtain these values. Then, labour augmented for human capital 
accumulation in region i at time t can be defined by: 
 
(3.1) Nit  =  Lit Hit  =  Lit eit [φFFit   +   φMMit]
 
where φF and φM, the coefficients on education in the Mincer earning functions estimated 
for Italy by Brunello et al. (1999), are respectively equal to 0.077 and 0.062.viii
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3.1) TFP and public capital. Panel estimates 
In the panel analysis, we assess the public capital-TFP nexus relying on a TFP measure 
computed through a Divisia-Tornqvist index: value added is the output and private capital 
and (human-capital augmented) labour are the inputs. In the computation of the Divisia-
Tornqvist indices we postulate constant returns to scale. Initial values are computed by 
assuming a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function with constant 
coefficients throughout time and producers (at sample mean values). Since we adopt the 
assumption of constant returns to scale for the TFP index, we maintain it for the role of 
public capital in the panel analysis. Hence, the stock of public capital entering the panel 
regressions is divided by one of the private inputs (labour).  
Why relying on input-share weighted indices instead of including public capital along 
with labour and private capital in a regression explaining value added? The main reason for 
this is that we want to adopt a very parsimonious specification on rather short time series 
and yet be able to analyse carefully the dynamic structure of the estimates, also taking into 
account the non-stationary features of our data. In particular we want to be able to ascertain 
the existence of a cointegrating relationship between infrastructures and TFP, and to test 
whether public capital is weakly exogenous. Both things seem difficult to achieve by 
estimating a fully-fledged production function, given our data constraints.  
We adopt the following empirical approach. First we ascertain the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship between TFP and public capital, relying on some recently 
developed panel techniques (Pedroni, 1997, 1999; Im et al., 2001). The concern for the lack 
of power of unit root and cointegration tests in small samples has prompted the 
development of testing procedures that take into account both the time-series and the cross-
sectional nature of the data (see for instance the discussion in Cavanagh et al., 1995). As far 
as unit root testing is concerned, Im et al. (2001) provide a test (henceforward, the t-bar 
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test) allowing each panel member to have a different intercept and time trend, as well as 
different autoregressive parameters and short-run dynamics, under the alternative 
hypothesis of trend stationarity. The test statistic is distributed as N (0, 1) under the null of 
a unit root: large negative values lead to rejection of the null in favour of stationarity. 
If the series under examination turn out to be I (1), we can test for the existence of 
cointegration vectors among them. We use for this purpose the ADF group-mean test 
developed in Pedroni (1997, 1999), which allows for heterogeneity both in cointegrating 
parameters and short-run dynamics across panel members. This procedure consists in 
estimating first the cointegrating regression: 
 
(3.2) itititiit xa ε+γ+β+α=  
 
which takes into account both regional and common time effects and allows the 
cointegrating relationship to vary across regions. We then test for stationarity along a 
constant mean of the error terms, using the ADF based group-mean panel cointegration test 
developed in Pedroni (1997, 1999), that is closely related to the t-bar test – in particular, it 
is distributed as a N (0, 1) under the null of a unit root. 
Once ascertained the existence of cointegration, we test for weak exogeneity along the 
following lines. We include our estimates of the cointegrating relationship in the following 
VECM system: 
 
(3.3) ititiitiitiiit exaa ++∆+∆+=∆ −−− 1131121111 εˆαααα  
 
(3.4) ititiitiitiiit exax ++∆+∆+=∆ −−− 1231221212 εˆαααα  
 
where ait is total factor productivity, xit are (core, non-core, total) infrastructures, εˆ it is the 
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residual from the cointegrating relationship, and eit is a random term. If the εˆ it’s turn out to 
be significant only in (3.3), public capital is long-run forcing and, according to the test 
proposed in Urbain (1992), is weakly exogenous. The significance of εˆ it in both (3.3) and 
(3.4) would imply that public capital is not weakly exogenous, meaning that inference 
about the impact of public capital on TFP cannot be efficiently made conditionally on 
public capital alone. On the other hand, if the εˆ it’s show up as significant in (3.4) only, it 
would be TFP to be long-run forcing and weakly exogenous. 
 
3.2) TFP and public capital. Non-parametric estimates 
The specification of the public capital-TFP nexus in the panel analysis is based on a set 
of restrictive assumptions on the production technology, such as constant returns to scale 
and a given functional form. In view of this, it seems desirable to test the relevance of 
public capital in the production process also through a very different route. Relying on 
some recent developments of the non-parametric approach to the quantitative analysis of 
production (Deprins et al., 1984; Tulkens, 1993; Kerstens and Vanden Eeckaut, 1999; 
Banker, 1996), we ascertain whether public capital enters significantly in a production set 
including value added as output and labour and private capital as other inputs. 
Non-parametric methods provide estimates of the upper boundary of a production set 
(the so-called production frontier) without supposing the existence of a functional 
relationship between inputs and outputs (Farrell, 1957). The frontier is supported by some 
of the observed producers, which are defined efficient. Not assuming a specific functional 
relationship between output and inputs is a big advantage when analysing the productive 
performance of different countries or regions. Therefore, non-parametric frontiers have also 
been used to carry out empirical research on cross-country or cross-region convergence. 
Notable contributions in this field include Kumar and Russell (2002), as well as Arcelus 
and Arocena (2000), Maudos et al. (2000), Henderson and Russell (2001). 
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Non-parametric methods are divided between those that impose upon the production set 
the hypothesis of convexity (usually gathered under the label of Data Envelopment 
Analysis, or DEA) and those that do not need this assumption (the Free Disposal Hull - 
FDH - approach proposed in Deprins, et al., 1984, Tulkens, 1993). In the latter case, the 
only property imposed on the production set is strong input and output disposability, while 
in DEA the additional hypothesis of convexity is made. More formally, in FDH, for a given 
set of producers Yo , the reference set Y ( Yo ) is characterised, in terms of an observation i, 
by the following postulate: 
 
(3.5)  ( Xi, Yi ) observed, ( Xi  +  a, Yi  -  b ) ∈   Y ( Yo ),a, b   ≥   0 
 
where a and b are vectors of free disposal of input and output, respectively. In other words, 
due to the possibility of strong input and output disposability, the reference set includes all 
the producers which are using the same or more inputs and which are producing the same 
or less output in relation to observation i. 
Let us take as an example Fig. 3.1, where we consider a technology with one input (X) 
and one output (Y). The input-output pairs correspond to producers examined at a given 
point in time. Beginning with observation B, we define every observation located at its 
right and/or below it (that is with more input and same output, or with less output and same 
input; or else with more input and less output, as F) as dominated by B.  
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In the FDH approach, this comparison is carried out for every observation, and 
observations not dominated by any other observation are considered efficient producers, 
belonging to the frontier of the reference set: On the other hand, the observations that are 
dominated are considered inefficient. Non-parametric frontier techniques share the 
hypothesis that the distance of inefficient producers from the frontier must be entirely 
explained by a factor (or a set of factors) traditionally termed inefficiency, which obeys a 
one-sided statistical distribution. For our aims, it is fundamental to stress that, if some 
inputs are not duly included in the production set, inefficiency can also represent a relative 
lack in one of these inputs (for instance, public capital). Subsequently, frontier analysis can 
be used to detect not only the inability to use a technology optimally (that is, inefficiency 
proper), but also relative gaps in factor endowments. In our case, by comparing the mean 
efficiency scores obtained with and without public capital in the production set we ascertain 
its significance as an additional input. 
The adoption of FDH allows us to leave behind the hypothesis of convexity of the 
production set typical of DEA. This means that the frontier obtained through FDH is likely 
to fit more closely the data than the one obtained through DEA, if the reference set is 
characterised (at least locally) by the existence of non-convexities.ix Also, as the frontier of 
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the reference set is made up of actually existing units (rather than by a convex hull), FDH 
will be less sensitive to the presence in the reference set of outliers (or of erroneously 
measured values) than DEA. More precisely, the part of the frontier influenced by the 
presence of the outlier will be smaller with FDH than with DEA. One problem with FDH is 
that possibly many observations may be efficient because they are located in an area of the 
production set where there are no other observations with which they can be compared 
(efficiency by default). An undesirable consequence of this in the present context is that if 
mean efficiency rises subsequent to the inclusion of infrastructures in the production set, 
this could be ascribed to the appearance of a larger number of efficient-by-default 
observations (the larger input set reduces the scope for comparisons and increases the 
number of efficient-by-default observations). This problem is particularly relevant in small 
data-sets (like ours). To circumvent it, we use a refinement of the FDH, the FDH-VP 
(variable-parameter FDH) proposed by Kerstens and Vanden-Eeckaut (1999), which 
decisively reduces the problem of efficiency by default. 
FDH-VP is defined as the intersection of FDH technologies that impose by assumption 
non-decreasing and non-increasing returns to scale. First, each observation is compared not 
only to any other observation but also to their smaller or larger proportional replicas; then, 
one selects for each given observation the assumption about returns to scale that yields the 
highest efficiency score. While FDH-VP differs in no way from traditional FDH in terms of 
the underlying hypotheses about the production set (strong input and output disposability, 
variable returns to scale), Briec et al. (2004) show that it is not the inner bound technology 
in a non-convex world (a property fulfilled by traditional FDH). Yet, FDH-VP greatly 
increases the scope for comparisons between observations, reducing correspondingly the 
problem of efficiency by defaultx and therefore curtails the risk that a higher mean 
efficiency in the presence of infrastructures may simply be the consequence of a larger 
number of efficient-by-default observations.  
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Hence an output-orientedxi FDH-VP approach is used in this paper to ascertain the 
significance of public capital as an additional input in the production set. We first estimate 
a baseline specification with value added as output and labour and private capital as inputs. 
Obviously we always refer to the industrial sector and to human capital-augmented labour 
input. Then, we also include among the inputs the stock of core, non-core, total 
infrastructures. If infrastructures are a relevant input, the efficiency scores of the production 
set including their stocks should differ significantly from the baseline ones. This 
significance is assessed through two tests: a standard t-test and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
(these tests are shown to have reasonable small-sample performance in Kittelsen, 1999). 
We refrain from using the bootstrapping test procedures suggested by Simar and Wilson 
(2000a; 2000b; 2001) because of their heavy computational burden. 
 
4. The Empirical Analysis: the Results 
4.1) TFP and public capital. Panel estimates 
We begin the panel cointegration analysis by carrying out the t-bar test provided in Im et 
al. (2001). As suggested in Hall and Mairesse (2002), this test is carried out after removing 
from each variable the year-specific means. The results are shown in Table 4.1 for ADF 
regressions of 0th, 1st and 2nd order. Core, non-core and total infrastructures can clearly be 
regarded as I (1) series, while the evidence for TFP apparently indicates that this series is 
trend-stationary. However, as shown in Karlsson and Löthgren (2000), the rejection of the 
null can be driven by a few stationary series. In our case, large negative values for the 
Veneto and Friuli Venezia Giulia ADF statistics seem to be crucially important in dictating 
the overall results (the regional ADF values are not given here in order to save space and 
are available on request) . Hence in what follows we regard also TFP as I (1), and proceed 
to test the existence of cointegration vectors among TFP and various stocks of 
infrastructures. Should this hypothesis be inappropriate, we expect this to be unveiled by 
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the cointegration tests and by the behaviour of the related VECM's (a similar argument has 
been made by Kremers et al., 1992, in time series analysis, and by Marrocu et al., 2000, in 
a panel set-up). 
In Table 4.2 we report values for the long-run elasticities from the cointegration vectors. 
These elasticities are very often positive for core infrastructures, smaller in absolute value 
(and sometimes negative) for non-core infrastructures, positive again for total 
infrastructures. Also, the largest (positive) elasticities relate to the North-Eastern, South-
Western and South-Eastern regions. Possibly, for North-Eastern regions this evidence is 
flawed inasmuch as TFP in these regions may be better described as a trend-stationary 
process. We then test for the existence of cointegration vectors using the ADF group-mean 
test developed in Pedroni (1997, 1999). The results of these tests are reported in Table 4.3. 
Again, we show statistics from ADF regressions of 0th, 1st and 2nd order. Like for the t-bar 
test, large negative values lead to rejection of the null (in this case of no cointegration). The 
evidence in Table 4.3 leads to rejection of the null of no cointegration, particularly in the 
case of core infrastructures. 
Finally, we ascertain whether public capital is long-run forcing. We test whether the 
residuals from the cointegrating relationships enter significantly in a VECM system 
analogous to (3.3)-(3.4). In Table 4.4 we provide the results obtained for a 1st order VAR 
(very similar results are obtained for other lag lengths). The null of no long-run effects from 
infrastructures to TFP is always decisively rejected, but in the case of non-core 
infrastructures there is also some evidence against the other null (no long-run effects from 
TFP to infrastructures). This would imply that non-core infrastructures are not weakly 
exogenous, and that inference about the impact of non-core infrastructures on TFP cannot 
be efficiently made conditionally on them alone. On the other hand, it seems that the impact 
of total infrastructures on TFP is largely dictated by the relationship between core 
infrastructures and TFP: both core and total infrastructures are long-run forcing and hence 
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weakly exogenous. 
A final point about the VECM estimates: the good quality of their diagnostics (not 
reported here and available on request) vindicates both their reliability and the choice of 
regarding TFP as I (1). 
 
4.2) TFP and public capital. Non-parametric estimates 
Some recent contributions (Kittelsen, 1999; Simar and Wilson, 2000a) have highlighted 
the possibility that non-parametric frontier methods may run into small-sample problems 
for sample sizes close or smaller than 100 observations. Accordingly, we apply FDH-VP 
not on single years but on four sub-samples roughly corresponding to cyclical phases of the 
Italian economy: 1970-75, 1976-81, 1982-90, 1991-98. The basic assumption behind this 
procedure is that the state of technology does not change appreciably within any one of 
these sub-samples.  
The results, which are presented in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, point to the significance of public 
capital. Like in the panel analysis, however, this impact is to be mainly ascribed to core 
infrastructures and is generally stronger in the Mezzogiorno. In Table 4.5 these points are 
made in an informal manner: we present the regional means over the four periods for the 
FDH-VP efficiency scores. The difference between the mean scores obtained without and 
with infrastructures in the production set are clearly strongest for core infrastructures. Also, 
the largest differences are found for the North-Eastern, South-Western and South-Eastern 
regions. All this is remarkably close to the evidence that can be gathered from Table 4.2. 
Indeed, the area which gains most from core infrastructures is the South-East, with both the 
North-West and the South-West benefiting less. Table 4.6 provides similar, although more 
statistically based, evidence. Its perusal indicates that significance levels are noticeably 
lower in the case of core infrastructures (especially for the t-test, which is expected to be 
more powerful than the KS-test). 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper focused on the impact of public capital on TFP in Italian regions. We have 
therefore analysed the relationship between productivity and public capital stock, using data 
for the 20 Italian administrative regions over the a longer time period (1970-98) than those 
considered in previous studies. We have concentrated on the industrial sector, assessing the 
robustness of the public capital-TFP nexus from several standpoints. We considered 
explicitly the non-stationary nature of the data and tested for the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship between public capital and TFP through panel techniques that 
fully allow for parameter heterogeneity across regions. We tested the weak exogeneity of 
public capital through the procedure proposed in Urbain (1992). We assessed the 
significance of public capital within a non-parametric set-up based on a refinement of the 
Free Disposal Hull. Finally, we controlled for the role of human capital on growth, in view 
of the large regional differences in size and evolution of educational attainment. 
We find a significant impact of public capital on industrial TFP. On average we obtain 
larger and more significant estimates for the elasticity of industrial value added to public 
capital than in Bonaglia et al. (2000), arguably because our panel procedures fully allow for 
the non-stationary nature of the data and for parameter heterogeneity across regions. Our 
elasticities (on average, 0.17 for core infrastructures and 0.12 for total infrastructures) are 
close to the 0.10 guess-estimate proposed in De la Fuente (2002). Still, we find a stronger 
impact of public capital in the Mezzogiorno than in the rest of Italy, and the core 
component of infrastructures comes out much more strongly. 
In qualitative terms there is broad agreement between our findings and those from 
Bonaglia et al. (2000) – as well as from Picci (1999). The bulk of the Italian evidence 
points to a significant (albeit possibly small) impact of infrastructure on TFP, in contrast 
with often insignificant results obtained for the US state panels, but not with the findings of 
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Mas et al. (1996) for a panel of Spanish regions. This evidence has obvious implications for 
the debate (to which we alluded in the Introduction) about the role of public investment 
programmes on regional growth. May be, public capital significantly contributes to output 
across Italian regions because infrastructure stocks have not yet reached an adequately high 
level, at which some sort of saturation effect may set in (for a similar argument about 
Spanish data see Mas et al., 1996; De la Fuente, 2002). 
In any case, the finer regional disaggregation of our analysis and the results from our 
tests provide ground for further considerations. A sharp divide emerges in the Mezzogiorno 
between the South-West and the South-East, with the latter area benefiting more from 
public capital accumulation. This finding can be explained by differences in industrial 
structure and environment (D’Acunto et al., 2004, find that at least in Puglia manufacturing 
is more reactive to exogenous demand pressure) or by the greater effectiveness of public 
investment in the South-East (see for instance the evidence reported in Golden and Picci, 
2004). Another important result is that some doubts arise on the weak exogeneity of non-
core infrastructures. Possibly, non-core infrastructures behave like a normal good: demand 
for them depends (among other things) on size of the industrial sector. This would imply 
that inference about the impact of non-core infrastructures on TFP cannot be efficiently 
made conditionally on them alone. The bottom line seems to be that core infrastructures 
have a key role in promoting regional industrial development: investments in core 
infrastructures surely have a stronger impact on the TFP of an area; eventually, through 
higher TFP, they can also induce investments in non-core infrastructures with an additional 
impact on regional development. 
More precise indications for policy-making can come from further research on these 
matters.xii In particular, the evaluation of regional differences in the impact of infrastructure 
on productivity deserves more careful consideration. Explanations for the regional pattern 
of this impact could rely not only on the composition of expenditure (within core and non-
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core infrastructure), but also on differences in economic environment (for instance, 
D’Acunto et al., 2004, find significant regional differences in the impact of export demand 
on growth). A crucial field of analysis is, in this respect, the effectiveness of public 
investment programmes. As shown in Golden and Picci (2004), this effectiveness is 
strongly linked to the factors unearthed by Putnam’s analysis of social capital (Putnam, 
1993; Helliwell and Putnam, 1995). Interesting evidence in this ambit can also come from 
the study of the role of European Structural Funds in the programme selection and 
financing. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
i These regions are Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna. In order to 
clarify some evidence given below note that Campania, Calabria, Sicilia and Sardegna belong to the South-
West. Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia and Basilicata belong to the South-East. Furthermore, the other region 
groupings are the North-West (Piemonte, Val d’Aosta, Lombardia, Liguria); the North-East (Trentino Alto 
Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia Romagna); the Centre (Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio). 
ii See on this Ministero dell'Economia (2001), as well as Boldrin and Canova (2001) and the references there 
provided. See also Biehl (1986). 
iii This literature is best summarised in Sturm (1998). 
iv The cost function approach is exemplified by Lynde and Richmond (1992) and Morrison and Schwartz 
(1996). In this paper we concentrate on the production function approach, still by far the most widely adopted 
in the literature. 
v Educational attainment in Southern regions has been typically lower and growing at a faster rate than in the 
North (the average gap was 16 percentage points in 1970 and 7 percentage points in 1998).  
vi We also tried a second measure of human capital, where the Mincerian coefficients (always from Brunello 
et al., 1999) were 0.055 for Centre-Northern males, 0.068 for Southern males, 0.071 for Centre-Northern 
females, 0.083 for Southern females. Using this measure did not yield results appreciably different from those 
which we report below. 
vii Labour income data have been constructed taking dependent labour income and adding to it an estimate of 
independent labour income (obtained assuming that independent labour income per worker is equal to 
dependent labour income per worker). 
viii See for details Picci (1999); Bonaglia and Picci (2000). 
ix It has been recently observed (Mundlak et al., 1999; Mundlak, 2000) that in cross-country (or cross-region) 
productivity comparisons one must rely on empirical aggregate production frontiers obtained from 
unobservable micro frontiers. In this case, when the available technology includes more than one technique, a 
modification of the environment faced by producers may lead to changes in technique (as well as to changes 
in the output-input mix for a given technique), and the hypothesis of convexity may not be respected for the 
observable aggregate production frontiers. 
x Destefanis and Storti (2002) provide an example of this within an empirical analysis of cross-country 
technological catch-up. 
xi We do not claim any hard theoretical ground for this choice. However, if we take an input orientation, in a 
two- or three input space the commonly adopted Debreu-Farrell measure of efficiency may not measure 
technical efficiency (in the sense of Koopmans, 1951) exhaustively. See on this Lovell (1993). 
xii There are two issues of paramount importance for the evaluation of public investment programmes that are 
squarely beyond the scope of our analysis: the opportunity cost of the invested resources and the typically 
distortionary impact of the taxes financing the programmes. Bonaglia et al. (2000) provide some tentative 
evidence on the first issue. 
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 4.1 – Panel Unit Root Tests  
 
    
VARIABLES  
 
LEVELS 
Model with Intercept and Trend  
FIRST DIFFERENCES 
Model with Intercept, No Trend 
    
 p =  p = 
 0 1 2  0 1 2
   
   
Total Factor Productivity Average ADF -2.63 -2.49 -2.46  -5.65 -4.02 -3.37
 T-bar statistic -2.50 -1.59 -1.93  -20.54 -12.07 -9.07
 P-value 0.01 0.06 0.03  0.00 0.00 0.00
  
Average ADF -1.85 -2.12 -2.15  -4.27 -3.34 -2.70Core Infrastructures 
per Worker T-bar statistic 1.69 0.28 -0.38  -13.68 -8.82 -5.93
 P-value 0.95 0.61 0.35  0.00 0.00 0.00
  
Average ADF -1.71 -2.01 -1.94  -4.05 -3.25 -2.58Non-core Infrastructures 
per Worker T-bar statistic 2.44 0.80 0.68  -12.59 -8.37 -5.33
 P-value 0.99 0.79 0.75  0.00 0.00 0.00
  
Average ADF -1.81 -2.05 -2.04  -4.25 -3.35 -2.69Total Infrastructures 
per Worker T-bar statistic 1.91 0.62 0.19  -13.54 -8.87 -5.85
 P-value 0.97 0.73 0.58  0.00 0.00 0.00
 
NB: Average ADF is the mean over the 20 regions of coefficients β in the following ADF level- and first difference-regressions estimated region by region:  
 
eyyty t
p
1j
jt1tt +∆+β+δ+α=∆ ∑
=
−− eyyy t
p
1j
jt1tt +∆∆+∆β+α=∆∆ ∑
=
−−
 
The test is carried out after removing from each variable the year-specific means. The P-values refer to the T-bar statistics, which are constructed from the average ADF’s using 
the small sample adjustment from Im et al. (2002, Table 3). The T-bar statistics are distributed as N (0, 1) under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
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TABLE 4.2 – Long-run Coefficients 
 
REGIONS  Total Factor Productivity and 
Core Infrastructures per Worker 
Total Factor Productivity and 
Non-core Infrastructures per Worker 
Total Factor Productivity and 
Total Infrastructures per Worker 
   
Piemonte     0.13 0.06 0.10
Valle d'Aosta 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 
Lombardia     0.19 0.09 0.14
Trentino Alto Adige 0.05 -0.01 0.02 
Veneto     0.38 0.20 0.30
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.23 0.14 0.19 
Liguria     0.25 0.14 0.21
Emilia Romagna 0.16 0.05 0.11 
Toscana     0.13 0.02 0.08
Umbria     0.10 -0.01 0.05
Marche     0.08 -0.01 0.04
Lazio     0.08 -0.02 0.03
Abruzzo     0.14 0.02 0.10
Molise     -0.02 -0.12 -0.07
Campania     0.11 0.00 0.05
Puglia     0.27 0.13 0.20
Basilicata     0.62 0.50 0.56
Calabria     0.02 -0.08 -0.02
Sicilia     0.13 0.05 0.09
Sardegna     0.36 0.22 0.29
    
Mean (N-WEST) 0.14 0.06 0.11 
Mean (N-EAST) 0.20 0.10 0.16 
Mean (CENTRE) 0.10 0.00 0.05 
Mean (S-WEST) 0.15 0.05 0.11 
Mean (S-EAST) 0.25 0.13 0.20 
 
NB: The long-run coefficients are the γi’s from the regression: itititiit xa ε+γ+β+α= , where the cointegrating relationship between ait (total factor 
productivity) and xit (core, non-core, total infrastructures) can vary across regions. 
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TABLE 4.3 – Panel Cointegration Tests  
 
  
MODELS  
  
 p = 
 0 1 2
 
Average ADF -2.42 -2.33 -2.28Total Factor Productivity and 
Core Infrastructures per Worker Test statistic -2.14 -1.79 -1.52
P-value 0.02 0.04 0.06
 
Average ADF -2.40 -2.27 -2.26Total Factor Productivity and Non-core 
Infrastructures per Worker Test statistic -2.04 -1.48 -1.40
P-value 0.02 0.07 0.08
 
Average ADF -2.41 -2.31 -2.28Total Factor Productivity and Total 
Infrastructures per Worker Test statistic -2.11 -1.68 -1.52
P-value 0.02 0.05 0.06
 
NB: The first step of the cointegration test consists in estimating the regression: itititiit xa ε+γ+β+α=  which allows the long-run relationship between ait 
(total factor productivity) and xit (core, non-core, total infrastructures) to vary across regions. 
Then, the average ADF’s are obtained as means over the 20 regions of the β coefficients in the following ADF regressions (estimated region by region):  
 
e t
p
1j
jt1tt +ε∆+εβ+α=ε∆ ∑
=
−−
 
The P-values refer to the ADF group-mean test statistics constructed from the average ADF’s through the procedure suggested in Pedroni (1997, 1999). These statistics are 
distributed as N (0, 1) under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
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TABLE 4.4 –Tests for the Presence of Long-run Effects 
 
 
 
MODEL 
   Null Hypothesis:
No Long-run Effects from 
Infrastructures to 
Total Factor Productivity 
 
Null Hypothesis: 
No Long-run Effects from 
Total Factor Productivity to 
Infrastructures 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test 148.56 18.24 Total Factor Productivity and 
Core Infrastructures per Worker P-value 0.00  0.57
   
   
   
Likelihood Ratio Test 134.71 29.77 Total Factor Productivity and 
Non-core Infrastructures per Worker P-value 0.00  0.07
   
   
   
Likelihood Ratio Test 143.55 24.26 Total Factor Productivity and 
Total Infrastructures per Worker P-value 0.00  0.23
   
   
  
 
NB: The likelihood ratio tests (distributed as a χ2 with 20 degrees of freedom) refer to the following VAR system: 
 it1iti131iti121iti11i1it exaa +εα+∆α+∆α+α=∆ −−−  
 it1iti231iti221iti21i2it exax +εα+∆α+∆α+α=∆ −−−  
where ait is total factor productivity, xit are (core, non-core, total) infrastructures, and the εit’s are the residuals from the cointegrating regressions considered in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
In the first column of the present table, the null hypothesis is that the α13i‘s are jointly equal to zero, while in the second column the null is that the α23i‘s are jointly equal to zero. 
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TABLE 4.5 –FDH-VP Efficiency Scores: Regional Means over the Four Periods 
 
REGIONS
 
Baseline 
Model 
+  Core 
Infrastructures
+  Non-Core 
Infrastructures
+  Total 
Infrastructures 
     
Piemonte 0.96    0.99 0.99 0.99
Valle d'Aosta 0.97    0.99 1.00 0.99
Lombardia 0.98    1.00 0.99 1.00
Trentino Alto Adige 0.99    0.99 0.99 0.99
Veneto 0.94    0.99 0.99 1.00
Friuli Venezia Giulia 0.88    0.98 0.97 0.97
Liguria 0.79    0.83 0.86 0.84
Emilia Romagna 0.97    0.99 0.98 0.98
Toscana 0.97    1.00 1.00 1.00
Umbria 0.95    1.00 1.00 1.00
Marche 1.00    1.00 1.00 1.00
Lazio 0.98    0.99 0.99 0.99
Abruzzo 0.92    0.95 0.95 0.95
Molise 0.91    0.96 0.91 0.95
Campania 0.85    0.88 0.87 0.88
Puglia 0.70    0.81 0.72 0.74
Basilicata 0.76    0.77 0.76 0.76
Calabria 0.73    0.73 0.73 0.73
Sicilia 0.82    0.85 0.82 0.84
Sardegna 0.87    0.93 0.87 0.90
     
Mean (N-WEST) 0.93    0.95 0.96 0.96
Mean (N-EAST) 0.95    0.99 0.98 0.98
Mean (CENTRE) 0.97    1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean (S-WEST) 0.82    0.85 0.82 0.84
Mean (S-EAST) 0.82    0.87 0.83 0.85
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TABLE 4.6 – Descriptive Statistics and Tests on the FDH-VP Efficiency Scores 
 
PERIOD 
 
 
 
BASELINE 
MODEL 
BASELINE 
MODEL 
+ CORE 
INFRASTRUCTURES
BASELINE 
MODEL 
+ NON-CORE 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
BASELINE 
MODEL 
+ TOTAL 
INFRASTRUCTURES
1970-75 mean 0.87 mean 0.92 mean 0.91 mean 0.91
 std  err. 0.12 std  err. 0.11 std  err. 0.11 std  err. 0.11
  T-test 0.0013 T-test 0.0035 T-test 0.0026
  KS-test 0.0035 KS-test 0.0080 KS-test 0.0035
  
1976-81 mean 0.89 mean 0.92 mean 0.92 mean 0.92
 std  err. 0.11 std  err. 0.11 std  err. 0.11 std  err. 0.11
  T-test 0.0139 T-test 0.0266 T-test 0.0169
  KS-test 0.0000 KS-test 0.0035 KS-test 0.0015
  
1982-90 mean 0.90 mean 0.93 mean 0.91 mean 0.92
 std  err. 0.11 std  err. 0.10 std  err. 0.12 std  err. 0.12
  T-test 0.0010 T-test 0.0733 T-test 0.0571
  KS-test 0.0000 KS-test 0.0010 KS-test 0.0000
  
1991-98 mean 0.90 mean 0.95 mean 0.93 mean 0.95
 std  err. 0.10 std  err. 0.08 std  err. 0.10 std  err. 0.09
  T-test 0.0000 T-test 0.0028 T-test 0.0000
  KS-test 0.0000 KS-test 0.0000 KS-test 0.0010
 
Mean is the period mean of the efficiency scores; 
Std err. is the period standard error of the efficiency scores; 
T-test is the p-value of the (one-sided) T-test computed vis-à-vis the baseline model; 
KS-test is the p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test computed vis-à-vis the baseline model. 
 
